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prosecuted against a union by an unsuccessful applicant for
membership who alleged that as a result of the union's refusal to
accept him he had been dismissed from employment in three
instances at its instigation because of his non-membership.' The
court has traditionally exhibited a reluctance to interfere with
the affairs of voluntary associations, including unions, so long as
they are created for lawful purposes, conduct their activities in
2
an orderly manner, and are not opposed to the public interest.
In the instant case, however, it was unnecessary to invoke this
line of jurisprudence since specific legislative enactment supported the action of the union. Plaintiff, a minor of fifteen years
of age at all relevant times stated in the petition, alleged that he
had been denied membership because of lack of apprenticeship
training and further charged that all his efforts to achieve appren*ticeship status had been thwarted by the malicious action of the
union. The union showed that its action was predicated on the
terms of a joint labor-industry agreement to which it was a sig3
natory, entered into under the provisions of Act 364 of 1938,
approved by state and federal authorities and establishing a minimum age of eighteen years for apprentices in the plastering
industry. The court approved the action of the trial judge in
dismissing the petition-a result which seems inescapable under
the circumstances. It is probable that the decision, or the statute
which dictated it, will be criticized in light of current inclinations
to condemn exclusionary devices which some unions impose upon
membership. But regardless of the merits of the controversy, the
remedy, if there is to be one, must be sought at the hands of the
legislature.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Jerome Shestack*
ELECTIONS

Election laws provided the main source of controversy in the
local government area. Election law cases, of course, are invariably tied into current political issues and just as invariably demonstrate that political cases do not make good law.
1.
2.
(1934)
3.

Hornsby v. LeBlanc et al., 217 La. 1095, 48 So. 2d 99 (1950).
Elfer v. Marine Enginers Beneficial Assn. No. 12, 179 La. 383, 154 So. 32
and cases cited.
La. R.S. (1950) 23:381 et seq.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Faculty Editor,
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In Langlois 'v. Lancaster' two cases were consolidated on
appeal2 as they involved two elections for mayor and officers in
the Town of New Roads, which were conducted within a sixmonth period in 1949. The first election was called for and held
pursuant to the town's charter on January 3, 1949. Lancaster
defeated Langlois by only one vote. Langlois and several other
electors then sued in the district court to have the election set
aside and another election ordered for the office of mayor, and
in the alternative that Langlois be declared the duly elected
mayor. Judgment was rendered on May 24, 1949, in favor of
plaintiffs, declaring the election null and void and ordering
another election. A suspensive appeal was granted and perfected
on May 26, 1949.
However, on May 19, 1949, prior to the rendition of the above
judgment, the Parish Board of Supervisors of Elections called an
election in New Roads for the offices of mayor and councilmen
to be held on June 14, 1949. Lancaster, who had in the meantime
taken the office of mayor, did not offer as a candidate in the
June 14 election3 and he and his adherents refrained from participating in it.4 The June 14 election was held and Langlois,
being the only candidate for mayor, quite naturally won. Before
the returns of the June 14 election had been promulgated by the
secretary of state, Lancaster filed suit in the district court seeking
to enjoin the promulgation of the June 14 results. An injunction
was granted. Subsequently, upon application to the supreme
court, a suspensive appeal was granted and perfected.
The supreme court agreed that the election of January 3 was
null and void. The main reason was that the registration of
voters had expired on December 31, 1948, and the new registration of voters began on January 2, 1949, 5 the day before the
election. Inasmuch as the law provides that "electors shall not
be registered within thirty days next preceding any election," 6
1. 217 La. 995, 47 So. 2d 795 (1950).
2. Langlois v. Lancaster and Lancaster v. Martin, 217 La. 995, 47 So. 2d
795 (1950).
3. Lancaster vainly attempted to enjoin the holding of the June 14
election and his application to the supreme court for writs was denied.
4. Lancaster's refusal to enter the second election was of questionable
wisdom, if one bears in mind the obvious irregularities in the first election.
He may have feared that participation in the second election would estop
him from subsequently challenging its validity. This fear, however, seems
groundless in view of the fact that Langlois' participation in the first election
did not prevent his challenge of it.
5. Provisions of La. Act 267 of 1946, amending La. Act 45 of 1940.

6. La. Const, of 1921, Art, VIII, § 16.
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it is obvious that no one could have registered in time to vote in
7
that election.
Concerning the appeal from the judgment enjoining the
promulgation of the June 14 returns, the court noted that the
granting of the suspensive appeal to the state officials had the
effect of releasing them from the injunction. Thereupon the
secretary of state had promulgated the returns certifying Langlois
and the others elected with him, and in due time commissions
were issued to them by the governor. Thus, said the court, the,
question of whether or not the injunction should be maintained
had become moot and the appeal was dismissed.
Since the January 3 election was declared null, the promulgation of election results by state officials certainly worked no
harm. However, at the'time a suspensive appeal was granted
from the injunction of the promulgation, the validity of the
January 3 elections was still undecided. In view of that, it would
have been fairer to those seeking to uphold that election if the
suspensive appeal could have waited until the decision on that
8
election had been rendered.
Subsequently, the state on the relation of Langlois and others
brought a proceeding under the intrusion into office act against
Lancaster and his councilmen to have them excluded from the
offices of mayor and councilmen, to have such offices delivered
to relators and to have refunded emoluments received by Lancaster and others for holding such offices. The district court held
that the respondents were usurpers and were unlawfully attempting to remain in possession of the offices. He ordered them to
deliver their respective offices to the relators and to pay all
wages and salaries or emoluments of the offices for the period
beginning July 1, 1950, until the time the offices were vacated
and delivered to the relators.
On appeal 9 the court accepted jurisdiction of the case only
insofar as the respondent Lancaster and the office of mayor were
concerned. 10 The first inquiry by the court was whether Lan7. The court also found merit in some of the other points raised, notably
the one alleging that the hours of election were not in accordance with the
election laws.
8. Had the January 3 election turned out to be valid, the granting of the
suspensive appeal (and the resultant promulgation) would have resulted in a
most confused situation. Realistically speaking, there was no danger, since
the court had undoubtedly decided upon the illegality of the first election
before granting the suspensive appeal as to the second one.
9. State ex rel. Langlois v. Lancaster, 218 La. 1052, 51 So. 2d 622 (1951).
10. The emoluments of office of the councilmen were too low to give the
supreme court jurisdiction. Their case was thus transferred to the court of

1952]

WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT

caster had shown his right to remain in office until a rightful
successor demanded possession of it. Lancaster contended that
he had such a right in that he was a holdover and as such required
by the Constitution" to discharge the duties of mayor until the
induction of his successor. It would indeed be a startling interpretation if one who goes into office solely by virtue of an election
which is subsequently declared null can be considered a holdover
under the Constitution. The court therefore properly rejected
this contention by Lancaster.
The court however accepted Lancaster's contention that he
was entitled to retain the emoluments of the mayor's office
received by him from July 1, 1950. The court noted that under
the statutes an intruder or usurper may be ordered to refund the
emoluments received where he attempts to hold the office in bad
faith. 12 However, the court did not believe that it had been
proved that Lancaster was acting in bad faith inasmuch as his
contention that he regarded himself as a holdover was made on
the advice of competent counsel and had not been previously
passed upon by the court. This interpretation of "bad faith"
certainly seems to limit the statute and lends encouragement to
office usurpers. As Chief Justice Fournet stated in his dissent on
this point: "But it is difficult for me to follow the rationale of
the majority opinion in holding that because the respondent is
tenaciously holding on to the office, on advice of competent counsel-even after our decision handed down on June 30, 1950,
declaring the nullity of the election under which Lancaster took
office-that he is holding office and receiving the muniments of
the office in good faith." 13
Webb v. ParishCouncil of Parish of East Baton Rouge1 4 presented to the court an interesting problem of statutory construction. In this suit Jesse L. Webb sought mandamus to compel the
parish council to call an election for the purpose of submitting
appeal. See State ex rel. Langlois v. Lancaster, 52 So. 2d 780 (1951), rehearing
denied 53 So. 2d 271 (1951).

The decision of the court of appeal not only

disregards much of the reasoning of the supreme court case but also seems
confused on the questions of what constitutes a de facto officer and the
meaning of Section 6 of Article XIX of the Constitution. For a good discussion of de facto officers in Louisiana, see Comment, 12 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEw
200 (1952).

11. Section 6 of Article XIX of the Louisiana Constitution provides: "All
officers, State, municipal and parochial, except in case of impeachment or
suspension, shall continue to discharge the duties of their offices until their

successors shall have been inducted into office."
12. La. R.S. (1950) 42:80.

13. 218 La. 1052, 1068, 51 So. 2d 622, 628 (1951).
14. 217 La. 926, 47 So. 2d 718 (1950).
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to the parish electors 101 proposed amendments to the plan of
government of Baton Rouge and the Parish of East Baton Rouge.
The district judge sustained an exception of no cause and no
right of action and Webb appealed.
One of the reasons given by the trial judge for sustaining
the exception was that there was not a sufficient number of signers to the petition which contained the full text of the amendments and which had been submitted to the parish council with
the request for an election. The supreme court chose to accept
this ground in affirming the district court. 5
Under the city and parish plan of government amendments
may be proposed by a petition containing the full text of the
proposed amendment and "signed by qualified voters of East
Baton Rouge Parish in number equal to ten per cent of the
number of votes cast for sheriff at the last preceding election of
parish officers and filed in the office of the parish clerk." 16
The petition in the instant case contained the names of 212
qualified electors. At the Democratic primary election for sheriff
preceding the petition filed 27,000 electors voted. At the last
preceding general election only about 1000 voters voted. Thus
whether or not the petition contained the requisite ten per cent
names depended on whether the word "election" in the plan of
government refers to general election or primary election. The
court noted that the drafters of the plan were surely aware that
a large number of voters participate only in the primary election,
which in the popular sense in this state is regarded as the election. If a petition containing the signatures of only ten per cent
voting in the general election were considered sufficient, it would
mean that a disproportionately "small group of disgruntled citizens" could harass the council and compel it to call one costly
election after another. Obviously this was not intended by the
drafters, hence the court construed the word "election" to mean
primary election.
It seems clear that the intention of the drafters (assuming
15. Another reason given by the district court was that the proposed
amendments were illegal and unconstitutional and even if adopted could not
be put into effect for this reason. Even a cursory study of the amendments
indicates that
point of view
political piece
not affirm on

the district court was quite correct on this point. From the
of the desirability of bringing to an end a long and clearly
of litigation, it seems unfortunate that the supreme court did
this point as well. I suppose, however, that one should not

quarrel with the supreme court exercising judicial restraint In not deciding
constitutional questions where other grounds for decision are available.
16. Plan of Government of the Parish of East Baton Rouge and the City
of Baton Rouge, § 11.09.
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they thought about it at all) was (or should have been) as the
court stated it. However, it is not at all -clear that the drafters
embodied this intention in the plan. The word "election" as
found in a statute or in the constitution usually means "general
election" 17 for even in the South an officer is not "elected" to
office until the general election has been held. What is even
more compelling in this case is that later in the section the word
"primary" was used by the drafters in referring to primary
elections.
The court in seeking out the supposed intention of the drafters departed from the plain meaning rule of statutory construction' 8 and in effect rewrote the section of the plan to include the
word "primary" preceding the word "election." Such judicial
legislation, of course, is not infrequent and perhaps in cases such
as this is even desirable, but it should be recognized for what it is.
The court's construction still leaves open some interesting
problems. "Election" now means "primary election." Does it
mean the first primary or the run-off primary? And does primary
include the primary of a second party, should one arise? It would
seem that the council would do well to forestall such problems
by appropriately amending the plan of government.
RFmovAL
A troubling problem concerning the removal of officers was
raised in Bourgeois v. Orleans Parish School Board.19 There the
school board dismissed plaintiff, a school superintendent, for
incompetency, inefficiency and unworthiness. The superintendent
was not allowed a hearing on the specific charges. Plaintiff then
sought to enjoin the school board from disturbing him in the
peaceful possession of his office, from interference with performance of his duties and the enjoyment of emoluments of
office. The district court granted the injunction but reserved to
20
the school board the right to try the plaintiff.
The school board pointed out that according to the statute,
17. McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 12.04 (3 ed. 1949).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S.
77 (1932). See cases cited in Cohen, Materials and Problems on Legislation 71,
73, 75-76, 93, 94, 163-164 (1950).
19. 219 La. 512, 53 So. 2d 251 (1951).
20. The school board appealed from the injunction. Plaintiff answered the
appeal praying that the judgment be amended so as to strike therefrom that
portion which reserved to the school board the right to try him. The supreme
court rejected plaintiff's appeal, holding that the school board was competent
to hold the hearing.
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"If at any time a parish superintendent shall be found incompetent, inefficient or unworthy, he shall be removable for such cause
by a majority vote" of the school board. 21 Under this statute,
the school board contended, there was no necessity for a hearing
and consequently its dismissal of the superintendent was proper.
The court rejected this view, stating that as a matter of
statutory construction, "it was unnecessary for the Legislature
to incorporate in the statute any provision granting such officer
a right to notice and a hearing before dismissal, because the fixing
of the officer's term and the providing that he may be dismissed
only for cause show that a hearing was intended."
Although many jurisdictions have arrived at the same conclusion, the courts have not very satisfactorily pointed out the
precise reason for it. Some decisions, as did the present one,
rationalize that the legislature "intended" to provide for notice
and a hearing. Other courts have approached the problem by
concluding that notice and hearing in such cases are a part of
the constitutional due process clause. 22 This seems clearly correct.
A dismissal for cause involves adjudication and the due process
conduct of adjudication carries with it procedural safeguards of
notice and hearing. The difficulty with imposing such due process
requirements in removal cases lies in the necessity of finding the
necessary deprivation of either liberty or property. Property
would seem the logical answer, were it not for the long standing
principle that a public office is a public trust and not properly
property within the due process clause. The obstacle present
in this rule has led some courts to qualify it by recognizing a
property interest for certain purposes, such as in controversies
relating to the possession and conduct of an office. 23 Certainly it
would seem that at least the loss of name and reputation attendant on a dismissal for cause is a property right sufficiently tangible to invoke the due process protection. Other judges, however,
of liberties as reason for
have preferred to find a deprivation
24
requiring notice and hearing.
21. La. R.S. (1950) 17:54.
22. State ex rel. Ryan v. Norby, 118 Mont. 283, 165 P. 2d 302 (1946).

See

authorities cited in Notes, 99 A.L.R. 336 (1935).
23. Sutton v. Adams, 180 Ga. 48, 178 S.E. 365 (1934); State ex rel. Ryan v.
Norby, 118 Mont. 283, 165 P. 2d 302 (1946).
24. See Walton v. Davis, 188 Ga. 56, 64-65, 2 S.E. 2d 603, 607 (1939). The
majority opinion in this case interestingly notes that notice and hearing had

origins somewhat older than our Constitution. "It will be remembered that
even the Almighty himself, although His wisdom is inscrutable and all His
judgments just, did not pass sentence upon Adam until He had first heard
the charge against him and he was given an opportunity to make his defense.
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These divergent reasonings make it all the more desirable
that the legislature expressly provide for notice and hearing
prior to dismissal for cause. In the absence of such provision,
however, it seems clear that through one rationale or another
the courts will find the means to impose desirable safeguards.
FRANCHISES

Public utility franchises were the subject of two cases, neither
of which involved any question of particular difficulty.
Prior to an expansion of the city limits of Baton Rouge on
January 1, 1949, relator operated a motor bus line over routes
most of which lay outside the corporate limits. After the extension of the city limits, all of the routes were within the city
limits. Relator made written application to the city for a certificate of convenience and necessity to continue the operation of
his bus line. Without having acted on relator's application, the
city council adopted two bus ordinances. According to these,
motor buses could only be operated by one holding a franchise
from the city. A franchise previously granted to the Baton
Rouge Bus Company was recognized and ratified; although this
franchise was declared not to be exclusive, the council also
stated that it had no present intention of granting other franchises within the near future.
Subsequently relator sought a writ of mandamus to compel
the city to issue him a certificate of public convenience and
25
necessity so that he might continue his operations. In affirming
an exception of no cause of action the court pointed out the difference between a certificate of public convenience and necessity
and a franchise. Since the ordinance required a franchise, a
certificate alone would still not entitle relator to operate his bus
line. Thus the granting of the writ of mandamus would be
ineffectual as a remedy and in such cases is not issued.
Thereafter, Hutton continued to operate his bus line and
was charged by an affidavit with violation of the city bus ordi26
nance. After trial, defendant was found guilty and he appealed.
Defendant's first plea was that the bus ordinance was invalid
because the city was limited in regulating the use of its streets
'Adam, where art thou? Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded
thee that thou shouldest not eat? And the same question was also put to
Eve.'" (188 Ga. 56, 63, 2 S.E. 2d 603, 606.)
25. State ex rel. Hutton v. City of Baton Rouge, 217 La. 857, 47 So. 2d
665 (1950).
26. City of Baton Rouge v. Hutton, 218 La. 871, 49 So. 2d 618 (1950).
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to the one requirement of certificate of public convenience and
necessity which, he argued, negatives the right or the power to
grant a franchise. The court, after reviewing the pertinent provisions of Act 169 of 1898 and Act 334 of 1946 properly concluded
that the city did have authority under those acts to enact ordinances to grant franchises.
Defendant next contended that the ordinance was an unconstitutional discrimination between the Baton Rouge Bus Company and others in a like situation. In rejecting this contention
the court took cognizance of the chaotic condition of transportation which in the interests of the public impelled the city council
to resort to one integrated bus system. Such action, said the
court, "cannot be said to have been arbitrary and'capricious."
TAXATION
Charles A. Reynard*
In the course of discussing the work of the court during the
1949-1950 term a year ago,' the writer called attention to a tax
case 2 in which it appeared that an issue of due process of law
had been mistakenly treated as one involving equal protectiona mistake which did not affect the result. In that case the taxpayer, a pipeline company, was protesting the inclusion of its
property within the limits of a levee district when adjacent lands
were excluded-both being within the spillway of the district.
Although the taxpayer raised the objection of equal protection
of the law, it was apparent that the real onus of its complaint, if
any, was the manner in which the boundaries of the district were
defined. This gave rise to the question whether the act creating
the district was such a legislative "gerrymander" as to take the
taxpayer's money without due process of law or whether sufficient benefit would be derived from the creation of the district
to justify the inclusion of the taxpayer's property within it. During the term just past the identical question was raised in Bahry
v. West Ascension Consolidated Drainage District,3 this time so
clearly that it was recognized and treated as a due process
question.
Plaintiffs in the Bahry case were taxpayers residing within
*
1.
2.
3.

Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 214 (1951).
Interstate Oil Pipeline Co. v. Guilbeau, 217 La. 160, 46 So. 2d 113 (1950).
218 La. 1028, 51 So. 2d 614 (1951).

